# Assertiones Theologicae. De Fide (*Theological Assertions. On Faith*)

**by Sforza Pallavicino, 1649**

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## De Fide, Chapter 7

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| *Latin* |  | *English* |
| **CAPUT VII.** |  | **CHAPTER VII.** |
| *De Evidentia credibilitatis, quam habet nostra fides, super omnes alias sectas: de certitudine quod scriptura cui credimus, sit autentica, & concilia, & Pontifices, quorum definitionibus ducimur, fuerint, legitimi.* |  | *On the Evidence of credibility, which our faith has, above all other sects: on the certainty that the scripture which we believe, is authentic, and that the councils, and Pontiffs, whose definitions guide us, were legitimate.* |
| **132.** Porro haec evidentiae credibilitatis ex multis capitibus maxima, & clarissima est in fide Catholica, quae capita hic tantum indicabimus. Primo enim certum est ex synderesi, quam omnes experiuntur, & ex consensu fere omnium gentium, atque ex aliis rationibus indicatis in libro *de actibus humanis*, dari aliquod numen optimum, & benevolu erga creaturas rationales, cui aliqua nostra opera placeant, alia displiceant, ideoque numen illud esse colendum, & amandum, neque huic rationi adversatur experientia frequens & calamitatis in probis & prosperitatis in improbis, quasi contraria providentiae: Nam haec ipsa summa providentia est, ut possimus exercere virtutem, & promereri aliam solidiorem felicitatem. Quaenam enim virtus esset, ea sectari, quae etiam in hac vita semper vel fere semper afferrent delectationem & prosperitatem? Porro si id eveniret, nullum esset discerniculum inter virtutis, ac voluptatis amatores. |  | **132.** Indeed, this evidence of credibility is, for many reasons, most substantial and clearest in the Catholic faith, which reasons we shall only briefly indicate here. First, it is certain from natural moral sense, which all experience, and from the consensus of almost all peoples, and from other reasons indicated in the book *on human acts*, that there exists some supreme deity, benevolent toward rational creatures, to whom some of our works are pleasing, others displeasing, and therefore that deity is to be worshipped and loved. The frequent experience of calamity among the upright and prosperity among the wicked does not oppose this reasoning, as if contrary to providence: For this itself is the highest providence, that we might exercise virtue and merit another more solid happiness. For what virtue would there be in pursuing those things which, even in this life, always or almost always bring delight and prosperity? Indeed, if this were to happen, there would be no distinction between lovers of virtue and lovers of pleasure. |
| **133.** Certum ergo est dari aliquod numen providum, & colendum. Cum vero sint varij cultus, & religiones erga huiusmodi numen quarum religionum una damnat alias tanquam impias, & huic numini invisas, non potest inter eiusmodi sectas invicem pugnantes esse plus quam una, quae sit vera & huic numini accepta; Quamvis possit evenire, ut aliquae propter ignorantiam invincibilem, eo inoffenso alias religiones sectentur. |  | **133.** It is therefore certain that there exists some provident deity who is to be worshipped. Since there are various cults and religions directed toward this deity, of which religions one condemns others as impious and hateful to this deity, there cannot be among such mutually conflicting sects more than one that is true and acceptable to this deity; although it may happen that some people, on account of invincible ignorance, might follow other religions without offending the deity. |
| **134.** Hoc posito videtur indignum hoc numine si permittat, aliquam religionem falsam habere pro se argumenta sine ulla comparatione maiora, & graviora, quam quaelibet alia, ac proinde quam ea, quae sit Quis enim prudens, & bonus hoc faceret; at nostra religio habet pro se plurima, & gravissima argumenta quibus praestat caeteris omnibus religionibus. ergo ipsa tantum est vera religio. |  | **134.** This being established, it seems unworthy of this deity to allow a false religion to have arguments in its favor that are without any comparison greater and weightier than any other religion, and consequently than the one which is true. For what prudent and good being would do this? But our religion has in its favor numerous and most weighty arguments by which it excels all other religions. Therefore it alone is the true religion. |
| **135.** Ultima minor, quae sola negatur ab aduersariis probatur ex huiusmodi argumentorum enumeratione: primo enim nulla religio habuit, vel habet tot Sectatores sapientes quam nostra; sapientes autem voco illos, qui praescindendo à re controversa, hoc est à veritate religionis procul dubio ingenio, eruditione, doctrina caeteris praestant omnium consensu. Sectae enim distinctae à Christiana vix ullum nominabunt sapientem cum nostris Patribus Theologis, ac Philosophis comparabilem, qui eas re ipsa, & ex animo secutus sit quantum ex eius vita, & scriptis constare potest. Platonem quippe, Aristotelem, Tullium; Senecam aliosque vetores Philosophos patet ex eorum libris fuisse a credendis Gentilium commentis alienissimos. |  | **135.** The final minor premise, which alone is denied by our adversaries, is proven through the following enumeration of arguments: first, no religion has had, or has, as many wise adherents as our own; and I call wise those who, setting aside the controversial matter (that is, the truth of religion), undoubtedly excel others in intellect, erudition, and learning by universal consensus. For sects distinct from Christianity can hardly name any wise person comparable to our Fathers, Theologians, and Philosophers, who has actually and sincerely followed them, as far as can be established from their life and writings. Indeed, it is evident from their books that Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and other ancient Philosophers were most averse to believing in the fabrications of the Gentiles. |
| **136.** Secundo nulla religio habuit tot sectatores insigni, & fere supra humana virtute praeditos. Tertio nulla fuit pro cuius defensione non solum fortiter, sed alacriter tot millia millium in quolibet sexu, aetate, fortuna sanguinem, ac vitam profuderint. Quarto nulla, quae habuerit tot contemptores omnium bonorum sensibilium, & humanorum ex sola spe illorum, quae talis religio pollicetur. Quinto nulla, quae habuerit tot ferventissimos Dei amatores, qui omnes suas cogitationes, affectiones, curas illi per totam vitam dicaverint supra omnem amorem, quo unquam vel mater filium vel maritus uxorem, vel quilibet homo quodcunq; obiectum sibi carissimum dilexerit. |  | **136.** Second, no religion has had so many followers endowed with exceptional and almost superhuman virtue. Third, no religion has had so many thousands upon thousands of every sex, age, and fortune who have not only bravely but eagerly shed their blood and given their lives in its defense. Fourth, no religion has had so many who have contemned all sensible and human goods solely from hope in what such religion promises. Fifth, no religion has had so many most fervent lovers of God, who have dedicated all their thoughts, affections, and cares to Him throughout their entire life, surpassing all love with which a mother has ever loved her son, or a husband his wife, or any person any object most dear to him. |
| **137.** Sexto, nulla religio est in cuius explicatione tot sapientes, vitam, ac studia impederint cum tanto admirabilium, contemplationum fructu: nulla si quidem scientia humana evidentissima tantumdem ingenijs consonantiae, admirabilitatis ostentare potest quantum Christiana Theologia. Septimo nulla est cuius veritatem testentur tot prodigia supra omnes naturales vires effecta, & innumeris, ac gravissimis historiarum, ac testium authoritatibus confirmata: quae omnia testimonia falsa esse perinde videtur incredibile, ac si quis contenderet non extitisse Iulium Caesarem, & omnes traditiones de illius existentia mentiri. |  | **137.** Sixth, there is no religion in the explanation of which so many wise men have devoted their lives and studies with such fruitful results of admirable contemplations: indeed, no human science, however evident, can display to minds as much harmony and admirability as Christian Theology. Seventh, there is none whose truth is attested by so many wonders performed beyond all natural powers, and confirmed by innumerable and most weighty authorities of histories and witnesses: that all these testimonies should be false seems as incredible as if someone were to contend that Julius Caesar never existed, and that all traditions concerning his existence are lying. |
| **138.** Octavo nulla est, cuius praecepta melius congruant cum lumine rationis divinitus nobis impresso, ut patet si conferamus praecepta Evangelii cum Ethica Aristotelis, & cum aliorum Philosophorum praeceptis, quae ad mores pertinent. Nono nullus propagatio fuit adeo mirabilis, & cum evidentiori numinis patrocinio: quandoquidem sine armorum violentia sine sensuum blandimento pauci homines ignobiles, infirmi praedicantes contemptum omnium eorum, ad quae humanus appetitus rapitur; quos homines sequi crimen erat infami morte plectendum, brevi tempore urbem mundi dominam expugnarunt, & meliorem mundi partem. Haec autem omnia praesertim simul iuncta compertum reddunt unum ex his tribus; vel nullam superis esse curam de rebus nostris, vel superis placere ut in eorum cultu decipiamur; vel hanc religionem, quam colimus, esse veram. Quorum prima duo cu sint impia, & lumini rationis adversa, reliquum est ut tertium sit evidenter credibile. |  | **138.** Eighth, there is none whose precepts better accord with the light of reason divinely impressed upon us, as is evident if we compare the precepts of the Gospel with the Ethics of Aristotle, and with the precepts of other Philosophers which pertain to morals. Ninth, no propagation was so admirable and with more evident divine patronage: since without the violence of arms, without the allurement of the senses, a few men who were ignoble and weak, preaching contempt for all those things toward which human appetite is drawn; which men to follow was a crime punishable by infamous death, in a short time conquered the city that ruled the world, and the better part of the world. Now all these things, especially when joined together, render one of these three things certain: either the heavenly powers have no care for our affairs, or it pleases the heavenly powers that we be deceived in their worship; or this religion which we practice is true. Since the first two are impious and contrary to the light of reason, it remains that the third is evidently credible. |
| **139.** Objici solet, infallibilitatem fidei dependere ex duplici fundamento & utroque fallibili, atque adeo non posse dari in ea evidentiam credibilitatis super omnia. Haec duo fundamenta sunt authoritas scripturae, & Romani Pontificis, aut Concilij a Pontifice confirmati. At in quolibet codice scripturae solent esse multi errores, ex iniuria typographorum, aut librariorum; quo fit ut in singulis, quae ibi legimus habeamus, prudentem rationem formidandi. Item, cum aliqua sint quae vel de iure divino, vel de iure positivo redderent irritam electionem Romani Pontificis, semper formidari potest num hic homo sit vel fuerit legitimus Pontifex. Sed utraque obiectio dissoluitur, nam quantum spectat ad primam, non redditur aliquid credibile super omnia eo quod tantum legatur in uno codice scripturae, sed eo quod ita legatur in multis, & passim ab authoribus Catholicis ita referatur: adeo ut quis posset conqueri de Deo tanquam de deceptore nisi per suam providentiam impedivisset ne aliquid falsum proponeretur cum tanta apparentia, & morali certitudine, ut humano discursu non posset discerni eius locutio ab eius non locutione. In iis vero super quibus non praecesserit haec apparentia, & moralis certitudo, non potest quis legendo unum codicem scripturae exercere verum actum fidei, nisi suppleat Deus defectum externae apparentiae per lumen internum. |  | **139.** It is commonly objected that the infallibility of faith depends on a twofold foundation, both fallible, and therefore cannot provide evidence of credibility above all else. These two foundations are the authority of Scripture and that of the Roman Pontiff, or of a Council confirmed by the Pontiff. Yet in any codex of Scripture, there are typically many errors due to the failings of typographers or scribes; hence, in each passage we read, we have reasonable grounds for apprehension. Similarly, since there are factors—whether by divine law or positive law—that would render the election of a Roman Pontiff invalid, one can always fear whether this man is or was a legitimate Pontiff. But both objections can be resolved, for regarding the first, something is not made credible above all else merely because it is read in a single scriptural codex, but because it is read in many, and is commonly cited thus by Catholic authors. So much so that one could complain against God as a deceiver if, through His providence, He had not prevented falsehoods from being presented with such apparent and moral certainty that human reasoning could not distinguish His speech from what is not His speech. However, in matters where such appearance and moral certainty have not preceded, one cannot, by reading a single scriptural codex, perform a true act of faith, unless God supplies for the defect of external appearance through internal illumination. |
| **140.** Quantum vero spectat ad secundum dicimus esse fide certum, illum hominem, quem multitudo Catholicorum pacifice, & concorditer semel veneratur aut venerata est tanquam verum Pontificem, esse verum Pontificem. Alioquin omnia nutarent & non haberemus regulam infallibilem fidei. Spectat ergo ad fidelitatem Dei ut non permittat aliquem eligi, & acceptari a tota Ecclesia Catholica si habeat aliquod impedimentum invalidans occultum, cuiusmodi esset defectus baptismi: sicut spectat ad providentiam Dei, ne irrepat in omnes codices scripturae aliquod falsum, & ne aliquis magus per daemonum praestigias exhibeat tantam apparentiam pro aliquo errore, quantam habet ex veris miraculis fides Catholica. |  | **140.** As far as the second point is concerned, we state that it is certain by faith that the man whom the multitude of Catholics peacefully and unanimously venerates or has once venerated as the true Pontiff is indeed the true Pontiff. Otherwise, everything would be uncertain, and we would not have an infallible rule of faith. It therefore pertains to God’s faithfulness not to permit someone to be elected and accepted by the entire Catholic Church if he has some hidden invalidating impediment, such as the lack of baptism; just as it pertains to God’s providence not to allow any falsehood to creep into all copies of Scripture, nor to permit some magician, through demonic illusions, to present such convincing appearances in support of an error as the Catholic faith possesses through true miracles. |
| **141.** Impedimenta vero inducta de iure positivo, & reddentia irritam electionem Pontificis sunt profecta ex talibus legibus, quae nunquam loquuntur nec intelliguntur nec possunt habere locum nisi respectu illius primae electionis, quam faciunt Cardinales, per quam adhuc non redditur fide certum quod electus sit verus Pontifex. At vero licet illa electio ex aliquo tali occulto impedimento fuisset irrita, adhuc sequeretur alia electio nullo iure positivo irritabilis, quam facit tota Ecclesia acceptando illum hominem pro vero Pontifice. Haec enim acceptatio licet moveatur ex errore praecedenti, non est tamen conditionata, sed absoluta. Melius quippe est Ecclesiae habere pro Pontifice aliquem qui fuerit invalide electus, quam ignoranter carere vero Pontifice, et eum pro tali venerari qui re ipsa non sit. |  | **141.** The impediments established by positive law that render a Papal election invalid arise from laws which never speak of, nor are understood to apply to, nor can have any place except in relation to that first election conducted by the Cardinals, through which it is not yet made certain by faith that the elected person is the true Pontiff. However, even if that election had been invalid due to some such hidden impediment, there would still follow another election that cannot be invalidated by any positive law—namely, the election made by the whole Church in accepting that man as the true Pontiff. For this acceptance, although motivated by a preceding error, is not conditional but absolute. It is indeed better for the Church to have as Pontiff someone who was invalidly elected than to unknowingly lack a true Pontiff and to venerate as such one who in reality is not. |
| **142.** Si enim expedit, dominia rerum non esse in incerto, et ideo inductae sunt praescriptiones non solum de iure civili, sed aliquae etiam longissimi temporis de iure gentium, et naturali, per quas dependent er ab errore fit dominus rerum ille, qui antea non erat dominus; multo magis expedit non esse in incerto authoritatem divini Vicarii, atque adeo de iure divino, et naturali est ut quicumque bona fide acceptatur ab Ecclesia pro tali, cuadat talis etiamsi antea non fuisset. |  | **142.** Indeed, if it is expedient that ownership of things not remain uncertain, and therefore prescriptions have been introduced not only by civil law, but also some of very long duration by the law of nations and natural law, through which one who previously was not the owner becomes, as a consequence of error, the owner of things; it is much more expedient that the authority of the Divine Vicar not remain uncertain, and thus it is by divine and natural law that whoever is accepted in good faith by the Church as such, becomes such even if previously he was not. |
| **143.** Et huc spectat ratio, quae affertur in *lege Barbarius ff. de officio Praetoris*, in qua declaratur, quod seruus electus ignoranter in Praetorem, & pro tali habitus, non solum fecerit acta valida, sed fuerit verus Praetor, quoniam Populus Romanus, qui eum pro tali habuit, potuit dispensare, & censetur voluisse. Porro praedicta lex non est consideranda tanquam constitutio arbitraria, & proueniens a potestate iuris ciuilis, alioquin respexisset futura non praeterita super quibus lex illa decernit, sed tanquam interpretatio prudens, & philosophica iuris naturalis: nam independenter ab omni constitutione positiva, censetur Populus Romanus habuisse in dicto casu illam voluntatem, quam expediebat eum habere. Ita ergo in casu nostro penes totam Ecclesiam est potestas providendi sibi de legitimo Capite ne remaneat acephala, quoties electores ordinarii vel culpabiliter, vel inculpabiliter neque provident, neque habent curam providendi in futurum; sicut contingit quando eorum electio fuit irrita, & habetur pro rata. In hoc ergo casu Ecclesia censetur eum eligere, quem acceptat, non obstantibus quibuscunque eius defectibus, quoniam ita expedit. |  | **143.** And this pertains to the principle that is presented in the *law of Barbarius in the Digest on the Office of Praetor*, in which it is declared that a slave unknowingly elected as Praetor and regarded as such not only performed valid acts but was a true Praetor, because the Roman People, who regarded him as such, had the power to dispense with the impediment and is presumed to have willed to do so. Furthermore, the aforementioned law should not be considered as an arbitrary constitution originating from the power of civil law (otherwise it would have addressed future rather than past cases, upon which that law makes its determination), but rather as a prudent and philosophical interpretation of natural law. For independently of any positive constitution, the Roman People is presumed to have had in the said case that intention which it was expedient for them to have. Thus, in our case, the power of providing itself with a legitimate Head, lest it remain headless, resides with the entire Church whenever the ordinary electors, whether culpably or inculpably, neither provide nor have concern for providing in the future; as happens when their election was invalid but is nevertheless held to be ratified. In this case, therefore, the Church is deemed to elect the one whom it accepts, notwithstanding any defects whatsoever he may have, because it is expedient. |
| **144.** Et quamvis Ecclesia acephala non possit dispensare contra constitutiones praeteriti Pontificis; tamen, ut diximus, nulla constitutio inductiva impedimenti extenditur vel ex mente, vel ex potestate constituentis in ordine ad talem casum; quoniam de essentia legis validae est, ut sit in bonum communitatis. Ex qua doctrina infertur, illos primos actus, per quos fideles agnoscunt novum electum in Pontificem, non esse quantum ad hoc actus fidei divinae, sed fidei, & prudentiae humanae, ac fallibilis; sed ex concordia illorum postea resultare in singulis obligationem fidei divinae ad credendum illum esse verum Pontificem. Si enim praerequireretur quoad hoc fides aliorum ad fidem meam, eodem modo praerequireretur fides mea ad fidem aliorum, ac proinde committeretur circulus in primo fundamento credibilitatis. |  | **144.** And although a headless Church cannot dispense with the constitutions of a previous Pontiff; nevertheless, as we have said, no constitution that introduces an impediment extends, either by the intention or by the power of its author, to such a case; because it is of the essence of a valid law that it be for the good of the community. From this doctrine it follows that those first acts by which the faithful recognize a newly elected person as Pontiff are not, with respect to this matter, acts of divine faith, but rather of human and fallible faith and prudence; but from their collective agreement there subsequently arises in individuals an obligation of divine faith to believe that he is the true Pontiff. For if the faith of others were prerequisite to my faith in this matter, in the same way my faith would be prerequisite to the faith of others, and thus a circularity would be committed in the first foundation of credibility. |
| **145.** Propter eandem rationem de fide est, Concilium ab Ecclesia concorditer acceptatum, fuisse verum Concilium; neque dicas sufficere ad infallibilitatem fidei si dicamus esse infallibilem in definiendo non solum Pontificem, & Concilium verum, sed existimatum. Quamvis enim ad tuendam utcumque regulam visibilem, & infallibilem Catholicae veritatis hoc tenerentur dicere illi authores, qui negaverunt esse de fide hunc hominem esse verum Pontificem; ex hoc tamen ipso eorum sententia est improbabilis. Nam Christus promisit tantum non defecturam fidem Petri veri, non autem existimati; & Petro vero dedit potestatem pascendi oues, & super Petro vero aedificauit Ecclesiam suam, eique tantum dedit claues scientiae, & potentiae. Quare nemo nisi verus successor Petri habet haec iura ex promissione Christi. |  | **145.** For the same reason, it is a matter of faith that a Council unanimously accepted by the Church was a true Council; nor should you say that it suffices for the infallibility of faith if we declare infallible in defining not only the Pope and a true Council, but also one merely presumed to be so. For although those authors who denied that it is a matter of faith that this particular man is the true Pope would be obliged to maintain this in order to somehow defend the visible and infallible rule of Catholic truth; yet from this very fact their opinion is implausible. For Christ promised only that the faith of the true Peter would not fail, not of one merely presumed to be Peter; and to the true Peter He gave the power of feeding the sheep, and upon the true Peter He built His Church, and to him alone He gave the keys of knowledge and power. Therefore, no one except the true successor of Peter possesses these rights by the promise of Christ. |